Responding to Humanitarian Crises by Gurtov, Mel & Mekjavich, Ellen
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy
Volume 15
Issue 2 Symposium on International Security Article 4
1-1-2012
Responding to Humanitarian Crises
Mel Gurtov
Ellen Mekjavich
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy at NDLScholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information,
please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mel Gurtov & Ellen Mekjavich, Responding to Humanitarian Crises, 15 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 507 (2001).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp/vol15/iss2/4
RESPONDING TO HUMANITARIAN CRISES
MEL GURTOV
& ELLEN MEKJAVICH*
Over the last quarter-century internal conflicts, often
marked by large-scale loss of innocent life, wanton destruction of
communities and environments, and systematic denial of human
rights, have become commonplace. Rwanda, Cambodia, Congo,
Angola, Yugoslavia, Liberia, Chechnya, Somalia, East Timor,
Sierra Leone: the list is long and growing; and each entry is a
reminder that we, the post-Holocaust generation that is supposed
to represent a more civilized humanity, have failed to act in time.
Equally tragic is that when the international community has
responded, it has rarely been up to the enormous task encom-
passed by the term "conflict resolution." Not one of the humani-
tarian crises, generated by the internal conflicts just mentioned,
can truly be considered resolved, even though some of those
countries are said to be at peace.1
The ruthlessness, venality, and repressive uses of power by
State leaders have led to the adoption of a new international
norm: the sovereignty of States is not absolute. The era of
unchallengeable State supremacy, as the former United Nations
(UN) Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, wrote in An
Agenda for Peace, "has passed .... It is the task of leaders of States
today to understand this and to find a balance between the needs
of good internal governance and the requirements of an ever
* Mel Gurtov is Professor of Political Science and International Studies
at Portland State University (Oregon). His recent books include GLOBAL POLIT-
ICS IN THE HuMAN INTEREST (Lynne Rienner, 4th ed., 1999) and CHINA'S SECUR-
iT. THE NEW ROLES OF THE MILITARY (Lynne Rienner, 1999, coauthored with
Byong Moo Hwang). Ellen Mekjavich is an M.A. candidate in the Conflict Reso-
lution Program of Portland State University.
1. As an example, Cambodia, the object of a $2 billion UN peacekeeping
mission, is today reportedly peaceful and politically stable, in the sense that the
Khmer Rouge have largely disintegrated, there are no political killings, a cen-
tral government is fully in charge, and the economy is growing. Yet, the gap
between rich and poor is widening, basic needs are not being met, population
growth far outpaces sustainable farming, illegal businesses account for much of
the economic growth, and the rule of law is a very long way off. See Seth
Mydans, Fragile Stability Slowly Emerges in Cambodia, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2000,
§ 1, at 1.
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more interdependent world."2 Some domestic affairs of States,
notably genocide and other massive threats to human security,
are now generally regarded as subject to international interven-
tion on the principle that in such cases a moral duty to humanity
outweighs sovereignty.'
But in practice, the norm of limited sovereignty is open to
significant qualification. There is no international consensus on
the precise line that should separate matters "essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction" of States from "threats to international
security" inherent in a humanitarian crisis. Nor is there a con-
sensus on which kind and what degree of assault on human beings
and their environment should prompt outside intervention-
that is to say, what exactly is a humanitarian crisis-much less on
what form such intervention should take. Even if there were a
consensus, there is no guarantee, as Rwanda and even the Holo-
caust itself showed, that State leaders will consider the preven-
tion of genocide a matter of national interest. Besides,
outrageous behavior by State leaders is often mirrored by their
opponents, and (as in the NATO bombing of Belgrade4 ) some-
times by their supposed saviors. International intervention is
itself open to abuse, as well as to incompetence and self-inter-
ested behavior by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and
other third parties. The cure may worsen the disease, so much
that some observers believe such interventions should be
abandoned.5
This article identifies three stages of a humanitarian crisis.
It proposes some guidelines in an attempt to answer the vexing
question: When, and how, should the international community
2. CARNEGIE COMM'N, PREVENTING DEADLY CONFLICT 135 (1997) (quoting
Boutros Boutros-Ghali and detailing the supporting views of the Commission
on Global Governance).
3. The "moral duty" of the UN Security Council "to act on behalf of the
international community... in the face of mass murder" was proposed by Sec-
retary-General Kofi Annan in his Millennium Report. KoFH A. ANNAN, "WE THE
PEOPLES": THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE 21sT CENTURY 48 (Mar.
2000), available at http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/report.
4. Note Amnesty International's finding that "[o]n the basis of available
evidence, including NATO's own statements and accounts of specific incidents,
Amnesty International believes that-whatever their intentions-NATO forces
did commit serious violations of the laws of war leading in a number of cases to
the unlawful killings of civilians." AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, NATO/FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA: "COLLATERAL DAMAGE" OR UNLAWFUL KILLINGS? VIOLA-
TIONS OF THE LAWS OF WAR BY NATO DURING OPERATION ALLIED FORCE 3 (June
2000), available at http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/kosovo/docs/
eur7001800.pdf.
5. For a particularly cynical view, see Edward N. Luttwak, Give War a
Chance, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 1999, at 36.
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intervene to prevent a humanitarian crisis in an internal conflict
from occurring, stop it from continuing, or at least help ensure it
does not happen again? To illuminate our argument, we under-
take a critical examination of the U.S.-led UN peacekeeping
operation in Haiti in 1994. There, despite the appearance of a
legitimate intervention, humanitarian concerns were subordi-
nated to national interests.
Informing our approach is identification with what Thomas
G. Weiss has called "political humanitarianism."6 We accept that
it is virtually impossible to separate political from humanitarian
concerns in today's internal conflicts, and that at all stages of
such conflicts humanitarian assistance is going to be shaped by
political preferences. At the same time, we are mindful of the
debate over the "new internationalism" and the dangers, political
and ethical, of interventionism in the name of doing good. Fol-
lowing Weiss, we take a "maximalist" approach to humanitarian
action-seeking to address the root causes of violent conflict and
carrying out a "human-interest" political strategy7 that puts peace
with social justice, environmental protection, and accountable
governance above any national interest.
I. THE STAGES OF INTERNAL CONFUCTS
Stage 1: Prevention
We must do more to prevent conflicts happening at all.
Most conflicts happen in poor countries, especially those
which are badly governed or where power and wealth are
very unfairly distributed between ethnic or religious
groups. So the best way to prevent conflict is to promote
political arrangements in which all groups are fairly repre-
sented, combined with human rights, minority rights, and
broad-based economic development.
-Kofi Annan8
6. Thomas G. Weiss, Principles, Politics, and Humanitarian Action, in 13 ETH-
ICS & INT'L AFrAis 1 (Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs ed.,
1999) [hereinafter 13 ETHics]. Weiss defines "political humanitarianism" as
"conscious decisions to employ humanitarian action as an integral part of an
international public policy to mitigate life-threatening suffering and protect
fundamental human rights in active wars." Id. at 4.
7. The concept of "human interest," and the values that lie behind it,
were inspired by the World Order Models Project. They are explicated in MEL
GURTOV, GLOBAL POLTICS IN THE HUMAN INTEREST (4th ed. 1999).
8. Kofi Annan, Statement to General Assembly on the Millennium Report
(Apr. 3, 2000), at http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/state.htm.
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The crisis of the State sets the stage for possible internal con-
flict; the best kind of preventive action anticipates the crisis and
seeks to move it toward a nonviolent settlement. Whether a crisis
of the State involves a rupture of State power (as in Yugoslavia in
1991 and Indonesia in 1999), civil war (as in Rwanda and
Angola), or outright collapse (as in Somalia), the key indicators
are political and social fragmentation and a real threat of
national disintegration. From the standpoint of conflict resolu-
tion, the fundamental challenge is how, with minimum violence,
either to restore national unity or, if that is impossible, to affect a
fair separation of contending parties. But that task-which often
entails the State's acknowledgment of genuine autonomy for dis-
empowered groups, their access to political and economic
resources, and arrangements for power-sharing-can hardly be
separated from broader considerations of human rights and
structural inequalities.
Michael S. Lund argues for a fairly narrow definition of pre-
ventive diplomacy, one that brings preventive action into proxi-
mate relationship with the onset of violence.9 Largely in
agreement with Boutros-Ghali's definition in An Agenda for Peace,
Lund says the purpose of preventive diplomacy is to "keep peace-
able disputes from escalating unmanageably into sustained levels
of violence and significant armed force."1 Lund rejects the
notion that addressing structural inequalities, such as by promot-
ing sustainable development and democratization, is. or should
be automatically included in preventive diplomacy. Though
improving economic and human rights conditions may help pre-
vent violence, he argues, it may also help bring it about. Nor has
it been clearly established that social inequality directly causes
violent conflict.'1
Lund is certainly correct to point out that not all internal
conflicts have taken place in poor, undemocratic countries. But
many of them, and especially the most ruinous and most difficult
to resolve of them, do occur there. And if it is true that a direct
link cannot be established between human rights (or other) dep-
rivations and social conflict, it is also difficult to dismiss their
close interconnectedness, in terms not only of oppressed peo-
ples' desperation to change their condition, but also of State
leaders' and elites' determination to keep their grip on power.
As Lund writes, preventive diplomacy:
9. MICHAEL S. LUND, PREVENTING VIOLENT CONFLICTS: A STRATGY FOR
PREVENTIvE DIPLOMACY 36-41 (1996).
10. Id. at 37.
11. Id. at 35-36.
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[C]omes into play only when policies, institutions, and pro-
cedures between States and groups at the local, national,
or regional levels that could handle disagreements and
maintain a process of orderly resolution either do not
exist, are breaking down, or fail to regulate political dis-
putes and conflicts of interests .... 12
But what if such "policies, institutions, and procedures" do
not exist or do not work precisely because they are a function of
oppressive conditions? Policies, such as dependence on foreign
military and economic aid and preservation of traditional landed
interests; institutions, such as police forces, courts, media, and
parliaments that represent only dominant classes; and proce-
dures, such as pervasive corruption and use of terrorist tactics
against political opponents are not designed to promote conflict
resolution. There is, in short, a systemic bias against social equality
and respect for human rights. Moreover, Lund's definition
presumes that a distinct moment can be discerned when escala-
tion occurs. But a humanitarian crisis may not crystallize around
a single event, such as a genocide or an attack that destroys a
village. Rather, the crisis may, as in Haiti, be so embedded in a
country's history that its daily toll hardly raises an eyebrow.
When that happens, one looks in vain for the usual early warning
signs of a crisis, for the humanitarian crisis is the early warning.
In a prolonged humanitarian crisis-El Salvador, Nicaragua,
and Cambodia are other examples-preventive diplomacy that
seeks to prevent disputes from turning violent would seem to
miss the point. In a political system that is hegemonic, social
conflict is not being "disputed"; it is being perpetuated by tyran-
nical leaders who will not admit of a legitimate opposition or
political alternative. Preventive diplomacy in such circumstances
can only be useful if it removes them from power and targets the
structural violence that has long fed the crisis. In none of these
cases, however, was preventive diplomacy even tried.
In cases of partial or substantial success, one key ingredient,
in addition to the will of the parties involved to avoid violence,
seems to be international attention-a great array of resources,
domestic and international, and a conflict-resolution agenda that
reaches to the sources of violence. The agenda might include
the kinds of unofficial bridge-building, transformative work-
shops, and "sustained dialogues" between adversaries developed
by Herbert Kelman in the Middle East and Harold Saunders in
12. Id. at 42.
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Tajikistan.' 3 Institution-building programs and economic devel-
opment projects would come into play as well. Policy reassess-
ments by international agencies, such as the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund, might be required in order to free
up resources-actions, for example, that might have addressed
Yugoslavia's economic troubles in time to avert a breakup in the
late 1980s.14 To the extent UN peacekeeping under Chapter VI
of the Charter would need to be invoked, its purpose in Stage 1
would probably focus on mediating autonomy talks. In the
extreme, and where feasible, a preventive deployment of forces,
such as occurred in Macedonia, should be an option strictly for
the purpose of separating hostile populations.
Stage 2: Peacekeeping
National sovereignty offers vital protection to small and
weak States, but it should not be a shield for crimes against
humanity. In extreme cases the clash of these two princi-
ples confronts us with a real dilemma, and the Security
Council may have a moral duty to act on behalf of the
international community. But in most cases the interna-
tional community should be able to preserve peace by mea-
sures which do not infringe State sovereignty. It can do
so, if our capacity to conduct peace operations is
strengthened.
-Kofi Annan15
When preventive diplomacy succeeds in internal conflicts, it
lays the basis for post-conflict peacebuilding. But when it fails,
large-scale loss of innocent lives may lie ahead. A winner-takes-all
politics emerges whose warning signs are cultural-psychological
scapegoating, power linked to identity, and extremist national-
ism. For international peacekeeping, Chapter VII replaces Chap-
ter VI as the basis for action.
But what should that action be? Annan has consistently
emphasized giving priority to gross violations of personal security
13. See Herbert C. Kelman, The Interactive Problem-Solving Approach, in MAN-
AGING GLOBAL CHAOS: SOURCES OF AND RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
501-19 (Chester A. Crocker et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter MANAGING GLOBAL
CHAOS]; Harold H. Saunders, The Multilevel Peace Process in Tajikistan, in HERD-
ING CATS: MULTIPARTY MEDIATION IN A COMPLEX WORLD 162-79 (Chester A.
Crocker et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter HERDING CATS].
14. Susan L. Woodward, Costly Disinterest: Missed Opportunities for Preventive
Diplomacy in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1985-1991, in OPPORTUNITIES
MISSED, OPPORTUNITIES SEIZED: PREvENTIvE DIPLOMACY IN THE POST-COLD WAR
WORLD 133-72 (Bruce W. Jenfleson ed., 2000).
15. Annan, supra note 8.
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over State sovereignty. 6 His idea, quoted above, suggests the
necessity of a rapid response aimed at rescuing people before they
become victims. The role of a Chapter VII action would there-
fore be, not to punish the side presumed to be responsible for a
humanitarian crisis, but to interpose military units so as to pro-
tect people under the authority of international law. The prece-
dent is UN Security Council Resolution 688 in 1991, which aimed
to protect the Kurds in northern Iraq from Saddam Hussein's
forces.1 7 A cease-fire could then be negotiated, sanctions for non-
compliance would be announced and carried out, and the
resources of NGOs and other third parties would be mobilized
for relief and reconstruction efforts. The sooner an interna-
tional interposition occurs, the greater the chances of isolating
extremists and gradually moving an impending disaster back to
the essential tasks of Stage 1.
Stage 3: Peacebuilding
The challenge of creating, or re-creating, the conditions of
peace in a conflict-devastated country is monumental. One rea-
son is that agreements to stop fighting all too easily break down.
Negotiated settlements are the most likely to hold and the least
frequently achieved. And many of those likewise do not "stick."
Sometimes that is due to insufficient follow-up resources (as in
Angola), sometimes to poor agreements (Sierra Leone), and
sometimes to international abandonment (Congo). Even more
fundamentally, as Haiti showed, international peacekeeping mis-
sions do not have the independence, organizational depth, or
political support to undertake effective implementation of a last-
ing peace. The conditions of conflict re-create themselves, like a
virus that has been quelled by antibiotics but still lives, waiting to
thrive anew at the proper moment.
In a sense, post-conflict reconstruction is an effort to return
a conflict to Stage 1. Whereas the chief humanitarian task in
Stage 2 operations is to rescue innocent victims of a conflict, in
Stage 3 the chief task is to devise and implement nation- and
community-building projects that ought to have been attempted
before the conflict reached the crisis stage. From the standpoint
16. "Emerging slowly, but I believe surely, is an international norm
against the violent repression of minorities that will and must take precedence
over concerns of State sovereignty." Kofi Annan, Our Differences Can and
Must Be Outweighed by Our Common Humanity, Commencement Address to
the University of Michigan (Apr. 30, 1999), in UN Press Release SG/SM/6977,
at http://www.un.org./search.
17. See S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982nd mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/688 (1991).
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of "political humanitarianism," professionalizing and integrating
(or completely restructuring) the army; building or re-forming
political parties, the judiciary, and other institutions; reducing
corruption; and rectifying social inequalities are all essential tasks
of post-war rebuilding. And they should be seen as being very
long-term tasks, as with preventive diplomacy, extending "beyond
the negotiating table" to as much as "the course of a
generation.""
Here, the role of third parties can be critical. As Fen Osler
Hampson puts it, their involvement works best "when [they]
entrench and institutionalize their role in the peacemaking and
peace-building process, that is, when they cultivate ripeness."19
To be sure, an activist conception of humanitarian assistance
runs the serious risk, most palpably demonstrated in the refugee
camps of Zaire following the Rwanda genocide, that NGOs will
become part of the problem instead of part of the solution. 20
They may choose not to play politics, but their very involvement
puts them in the politics business. It is thus important that
NGOs understand the limits of what they can accomplish; be
more than a little familiar with local history, language, and polit-
ics; and condition assistance on performance.2 1 Perhaps they
will decide not to become involved at all, given the practicalities
of particular situations or the unacceptability of the partnerships
they may have to establish. Thus, Mdecins Sans Frontiires, an
NGO that is forthright in advocating on behalf of human rights
victims, is probably right to reject making humanitarian work
part of a conflict-resolution strategy.22
The quest is not just for agreement, but for a sustainable
peace.23 One may think of that in terms of four phases:
18. Jan Egeland, The Oslo Accord: Multiparty Facilitation through the Norwe-
gian Channel, in HERDING CATS, supra note 13, at 529, 545. Egeland wrote: "Per-
haps the biggest mistake made during the Oslo [Israeli-Palestinian]
negotiations was to agree to judge the success of the peace process based on
what could be achieved during a five-year period rather than over the course of
a generation." Id.
19. Fen Osler Hampson, Why Orphaned Peace Settlements are More Prone to
Failure, in MANAGING GLOBAL CHAOS, supra note 13, at 533, 535.
20. See PHILLIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YoU THAT TOMORROW
WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA 266-72 (1998).
21. See Weiss, supra note 6, at 17-18.
22. SeeJoelle Tanguy & Fiona Terry, Humanitarian Responsibility and Com-
mitted Action: Response to Principles, Politics, and Humanitarian Action, in 13 ETHICS,
supra note 6, at 29, 31-32.
23. See Kumar Rupesinghe, Mediation in Internal Conflicts: Lessons from Sri
Lanka, in RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
MEDIATION 153 (Jacob Bercovitch ed., 1996).
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* conflict containment, referring to cease-fire management,
demobilization, disarming of regular and irregular
forces, and their integration in a single professional
military;
* implementation, referring to elements of the agreement
that need to be brought into play: repatriation, resettle-
ment, power-sharing, and confidence-building measures
(C.B.M.s);
* institution-building and basic-needs planning and
* conciliation.24
The chances of achieving a sustainable peace, as Harold
Saunders has long maintained, are greatly enhanced if conflict
resolution is multilevel. Each of the four phases, in other words,
probably requires resources and attention simultaneously at
every level of involvement-local, state, and international-and
by official and unofficial actors. For example, at the local level,
international peacekeeping forces may be training police. Mean-
while, local officials may be establishing new working relation-
ships with citizens in community-based development projects,25
and NGOs may be conducting workshops that seek to bridge and
perhaps transform personal relationships between members of
adversarial communities. But in all these projects, conditionality
seems to be an important ingredient-It is not a matter of throw-
ing maximum resources at problems, which can result in enor-
mous waste and worsening problems, but of tying outside
assistance to progress toward creating democratic ways of gov-
erning and carrying out humane, sustainable development.
Secondly, as has often been observed, the parties to a sus-
tainable peace need to have the political will to agree. But, we
have also learned, mainly from the secret Israeli-Palestinian
negotiations at Oslo in 1993, that political will needs to be cou-
pled with the values and perseverance needed to realize it-a
commitment to partnership in the peace project, acceptance of
the opponent's equality and legitimacy, the willingness to fight
through disagreements and adverse developments, and optimism
that agreement is actually possible.
24. See generally id., supra note 23, at 153-69 (discussing prerequisites for
building a solid peace agreement).
25. See Marcus Colchester, Sustaining the Forests: The Community-Based
Approach in South and Southeast Asia, 25 DEv. AND CHANGE 69 (1994).
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II. THE HAITI CASE
A. A Disrupted Sovereignty
Haiti is not a case of civil war in which sovereignty is con-
tested, and ethnic or other identity issues are at stake. We prefer
to call it a case of disrupted sovereignty and civil conflict.2 6 State
power was illegally seized in 1991 by a military junta that ruled by
terror and corruption, milking an impoverished country in the
manner of the Duvalier dictatorship that preceded it. Civil war
was not a threat inasmuch as there was no organized opposition
to the military. But civil conflict was a fact of life due to system-
atic human rights violations, including political assassinations,
perpetrated by military and paramilitary forces.
Political violence is only one element of Haiti's long-running
humanitarian crisis. The other element is its underdevelop-
ment.2 7 Of a total population of eight million, about two-thirds
live in rural areas; and of that number, about eighty-one percent
live in extreme poverty. Haiti has a high birth rate-the popula-
tion is projected to be around twelve million by 2030-and its
population density in relation to arable land is greater than
China's. The labor force of around three million, of which
women comprise forty-three percent, is growing at an annual
rate of two percent, ensuring high unemployment. Nearly one-
quarter of children ages ten to fourteen work. Typically of the
poorest Third World countries, Haiti also has high male and
female illiteracy (around fifty percent) and a disastrous health
care picture-virtually no doctors, very low public-health spend-
ing, high infant mortality, and low access to drinkable water.
The failure of successive Haitian governments to meet the peo-
ple's basic needs is one sign of the country's impoverishment.
The other is the economy-continual balance of payment defi-
26. "Haiti wasn't even a sovereign nation. Haiti was a country kidnapped by
a small group of uniformed bandits, self-important drug dealers, and unscrupulous busi-
nessmen." BOB SHACOcHIS, THE IMMACULATE INVASION 28 (1999).
27. All information in this paragraph is drawn from World Bank statistical
tables giving data from various years in the 1990s. See WORLD BANK GROUP,
WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1999/2000: ENTERING THE 21ST CENTURY, availa-
ble at http://www.worldbank.org/wdr/2000.fullreport.html (Aug. 1999). Over-
all, in terms of "human development" as defined by the United Nations
Development Program, Haiti is the only country in the Western Hemisphere
that is ranked among the bottom thirty-five countries in the world. See Barbara
Crossette, Misery Index of U.N. Panel Finds Africa Is Worst Off, N.Y. TIMES, July 5,
2000, at A9.
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cits that compel dependence on foreign aid and foreign
investment. 28
The absence of democratic structures and economic justice
in Haiti is rooted in historic inequality and suffering. Hardship
has long been a way of life for the majority of Haitians. Since a
successful war of independence in 1804 ended colonial rule and
struck fear in the hearts of slave-owners throughout North
America, there has been an increasing cultural and economic
gap between the rural and urban Port-au-Prince populations.
Power was consolidated in the capital, nicknamed "The Republic
of Port-au-Prince," where the minority French-speaking mulatto
aristocracy continued to profit from trade relationships estab-
lished when the Haitian colony imported more enslaved Africans
than anywhere else in the Americas. One telling indicator of this
imbalance is that in 1987, one-half of one percent of Haitians
earned forty-six percent of the national income.29
The military power and personal wealth of the Duvalier fam-
ily were products of this class division-the feared Tonton
Macoutes, created by Frangois "Papa Doc" Duvalier to cleanse
the army of opposition forces, recruited its numbers from the
poor and illiterate blacks of Port-au-Prince's ghettos. Where Hai-
tians had no money, they lived in desperation and were more
easily mobilized by the side that promised power and material
reward.3" Military rule ensured that there was no legitimate
channel for the moderation of conflict between the people and
their leadership.
B. The Defeat of Democracy, 1987-1991
Unfortunately, the ousting of the Duvalier regime in 1986
did not result in the kinds of social changes hoped for by poor
28. Haiti's international ledger shows significant debt, mostly (nearly $1
billion in 1999) owed to multilateral banks. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-
OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, JOINT BIS-IMF-OECD-WoRLD BANK STATISTICS ON
ECONOMIC DEBT, available at http://www.oecd.org/dac/debt/htm/jt hai.htm
(last modified Aug. 31, 2000). Foreign investment is small and recovering from
the capital flight that accompanied the military coup; but in relation to the size
of Haiti's economy, even limited foreign investment-mostly American, and
amounting to about $16 million (Texaco, Shell, and Standard Oil) between
1995 and 1999-is important for those wealthy Haitians who are tied to it. See
generally Haiti: Investment Climate Statement, at http://www.tradeport.org/ts/
countries/haiti/climate.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2001).
29. See Michael S. Hooper, Model Underdevelopment, in HAm: DANGEROUS
CROSSROADS 134 (Deirde McFadyen & Pierre LaRamee eds., 1995) [hereinafter
HAM].
30. See Greg Chamberlin, Up By the Roots: Haitian History through 1987, in
HAm, supra note 29, at 15.
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Haitians. Using much needed aid money as leverage, including
termination of military aid, the United States pressured former
Duvalier loyalists who retained powerful positions within the mili-
tary and new National Governing Council (C.N.G.), to hold new
elections. The C.N.G. agreed even as the army began to violently
suppress the opposition parties and populist movements that
were forming within a nascent civil society. The end result was a
series of elections starting in 1987 amid outbursts of violence
against reformers, the outcomes of which were not seen as legiti-
mate by the Haitian people. 1 Clearly, the human rights viola-
tions committed by the Haitian police and military throughout
these years were a product of the desire of an elite few to con-
tinue to profit from their position in Haitian society and in the
international economy.
Haiti's plight was well documented by relief organizations
and governmental agencies, including the U.S. State Department
in its annual human rights reports to the Congress. 32 The perva-
sive official violence and disregard for fundamental human
rights were early warning signs of the potential for deepening
oppression. Among the steps that could have been taken were
an international needs assessment to determine high-priority
development projects; international development assistance
monitored to ensure that it would be allocated for poverty relief
and other humanitarian goals; redirection and mobilization of
the Haitian military toward assisting in these development
projects; placement of human rights monitoring teams with
access to resources that would allow them effectively to docu-
ment infractions; and workshops conducted by outside parties in
collaboration with Haiti's civic organizations, business commu-
nity, and local political leaders. Unfortunately, the international
response to political instability gave priority to the holding of
elections, and not to the creation of a safe and healthy populace.
The period between the election of Jean-Bertrand Aristide
in December 1990, and his overthrow by the military in Septem-
ber 1991, represented a unique opportunity for the international
community to meet the aspirations of ordinary Haitians that
their grievances would finally have a voice, through new institu-
tions. The identity assumed by Aristide and his supporters was
shaped both by a Populist party platform that emphasized the
duty of those with resources to sacrifice some of them for the
31. See AMERICA WATCH/NATIONAL COALITION FOR HAITIAN REFUGEES/
CARIBBEAN RIGHTS, THE MORE THINGS CHANGE . . . HUMAN RIGHTS IN HAITI
117-26 (1989).
32. See U.S. Department of State, Haiti Human Rights Practices (Feb. 1995),
at www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/hrp-reports-mainhp.html.
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benefit of those less fortunate, and by a genuine terror of the
brutality that had been exhibited by the military. When sixty-
seven percent of the population voted in favor of the reforms
that Aristide's presidency promised to bring them, it was a man-
date to break a cycle of poverty that was connected to a system of
exploitation and abuse."3
Some of Aristide's actions following his inauguration, how-
ever, were partially responsible for furthering the distance
between the two sides. First, Aristide displayed little regard for
the wishes of the parliament, which had been elected with only a
fifteen percent voter turnout, when he unilaterally imposed a
series of reforms. In an attempt at reconciling his own goals for
the improvement of living conditions with the needs of an army
on the defensive, Aristide allotted $6 million for bettering the
working conditions of soldiers. Simultaneously, Aristide
replaced the army's high command and appointed a cabinet to
review human rights abuses during the post-Duvalier years.34
The latter of these actions was clearly undertaken to address the
climate of fear that the Haitian people had lived under in previ-
ous years; but for obvious reasons, it was seen as a threatening
move by the many who would face punishment.
It is also likely that Aristide did not do enough at this time to
dissuade those who were fearful of their lives and who wanted to
see justice done from using violence. Some, particularly mem-
bers of the military who cited it as a primary reason for the coup
and subsequent reluctance to return power, felt that Aristide
actually encouraged his supporters to seek violent retribution
against members of the military. There is some evidence that
Aristide indirectly advocated the use of "Pare Lebrun," or the
"necklacing" of soldiers by setting fire to gasoline-soaked tires
hung around the soldiers' necks, but it is not clear that this prac-
tice was routinely employed or encouraged by Aristide himself. 5
Later, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) cited this prac-
tice in a report to Congress as evidence of Aristide's unfitness to
return to office.36 Among low-ranking soldiers, uncertainty
about the future made it easy for commanders to persuade them
of the necessity of a coup "as a way of fostering the unity and
33. See Greg Chamberlin, An Interregnum: Haitian History 1987-1990, in
HAm, supra note 29, at 39.
34. See Greg Chamberlin, Haiti's "Second Independence". Aristide's Seven
Months in Office, in HAm, supra note 29 at 51-56.
35. See DAVID MALONE, DECISION MAKING IN THE UN SECURrr COUNCIL
60-61 (1998).
36. See Stephen Holmes, Administration is Fighting Itself on Haiti Policy, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 22, 1993, § 1, at 1.
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spirit of solidarity of the army." 7 No less significant was Jean-
Claude Duvalier's impending trial and his promise to turn over
the names of his co-conspirators, both civilian and military."8
Here again, an international presence in Haiti directed toward
rebuilding the army and judicial system might have averted a
coup. But the United States, among others, was content to take
some credit for the elections and otherwise play no significant
role in Haiti's rebuilding. That left U.S. policy in the hands of
agencies close to the Haitian military and paramilitary forces hos-
tile to Aristide.
C. The Failure of Peacekeeping, 1992-94
It took about a year and a half for the UN Security Council,
early in 1993, to impose an arms and fuel embargo on the coup
regime in response to Aristide's plea for help. During that time
the military's human rights abuses reached shocking levels-
imposing rule by terror, forcing people into desperate flight,
plundering the economy.3 9 All this took place under the noses
of a growing international presence in Haiti that included an
impossibly small Organization of American States (OAS) human
rights observer mission. A 400-member UN observer mission
(U.N.M.I.H.) did effectively curb some of the abuses, and the UN
embargo more thoroughly sealed Haitian ports, increasing pres-
sure on the coup leaders.40 But the one negotiated agreement
between Aristide and the "de factos"-at Governors Island, New
York, in July 1993-addressed neither the humanitarian crisis
nor the need for reconciliation. It merely set the terms for Aris-
tide's restoration,41 and was reached only because both sides
decided they had nothing to gain by appearing to be uncompro-
37. MICHAEL LAGUERRE, THE MILITARY AND SOCIETY IN HAmI 189 (1993).
38. See id.
39. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CouNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES FOR 1994, S. PRT. No. 104-12, at 420 (1995) (documenting systemic
and extensive violations of labor laws governing child labor, unionization, and
health and safety and noting the "political and extrajudicial killings by the
security forces and their allies; disappearances; and politically motivated rapes,
beatings, and other mistreatment of citizens, both in and out of prison"). See
also SHAcoCHIS, supra note 26, at 34-36 (addressing the military's strategy of
repression by selected assassination).
40. See AMERICAS WATCH, HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH & NAT'L COALrTON FOR
HAILAN REFUGEES, SILENCING A PEOPLE: THE DESTRUCTION OF CIL SOCIETY IN
HAITI 3 (1993).
41. The terms included Aristide's naming of a new prime minister, crea-
tion of an independent police force, amnesty for the coup leaders, deployment
of the U.N.M.I.H. to help modernize the army, and Aristide's return to power
on Oct. 30, 1993. See Barbara McDougall, Haiti: Canada's Role, in HERDING
CATS, supra note 13, at 396.
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mising. Little wonder that the junta failed to comply with the
agreement, compelling reimposition of the sanctions and, in
mid-1994, UN Security Council Resolution 940, which authorized
the use of "all necessary means" under Chapter VII of the Char-
ter to dislodge the junta.
It is not altogether plausible that mediating reconciliation
could have been attained since one side had so flagrantly violated
national and international standards of behavior. But any such
possibility was undermined by the inconsistent and unprincipled
nature of U.S. policies. First and foremost, an absence of U.S.
public statements recriminating the military for abuses were the
least frequent when Haitian refugees, or "boat people," picked
up off the coast of Florida were at their most numerous. The
refugees, whose numbers reached 40,000 in 1991 at the height of
the violence, were regularly repatriated despite former President
Clinton's campaign promise to halt this practice.42 Instead of
using its moral authority, the administration squandered it by
violating international law and an American tradition of granting
asylum to political refugees.
The counterpoint to the continued repatriation of displaced
Haitians was the United States' reluctance to endanger American
lives through a military enforcement of Aristide's presidency.
The supreme test of American resolve to end the conflict came
with the attempted docking of the USS Harlan County in Port-au-
Prince in October 1993. When demonstrators waiting at the
gates of the port threatened diplomats and press with their ability
to "turn this into another Somalia," the ship received orders to
turn around.4" This decision was made without consultation with
the UN and showed an unwillingness to implement the Gover-
nors Island Agreement.44
Perhaps the most disturbing and counterproductive element
of U.S. involvement following the coup was the evident backing
of Haitian paramilitary groups by American intelligence agen-
cies. According to Emmanuel Constant, leader of the Front for
the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (F.R.A.P.H.), a terrorist
group responsible for the burning down of Cit6 Soleil, Port-Au-
Prince's largest slum in 1993, and organizer of the Harlan County
protests, he began the group at the "urging of the Defense Intel-
ligence Agency."45 Lawrence Pezzullo, chief negotiator at Gover-
42. See MALoNE, supra note 35, at 104-05.
43. Howard French, Haitians Block Landing of U.S. Forces, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct.
12, 1993, at Al.
44. See id.
45. Allan Nairn, Haiti Under the Gun: How U.S. Intelligence has been Exercis-
ing Crowd Control, NATrION, Jan. 8, 1996, at 11-16.
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nors Island, indicated that F.R.A.P.H.'s power was used to
convince Aristide that his influence over the Haitian majority was
being usurped and that he should thus accept the terms of the
agreement. 4 6 Constant is said to have reported daily to the CIA
station chief and, along with junta leaders, to have been on the
CIA's payroll.47 If these statements are true-and the evidence
strongly indicates that they are4 8 U.S. credibility as a mediator
and upholder of democracy in Haiti is irretrievably damaged.
The U.S. strategy of coercion actually seems to have been
felt far more by Aristide than by the military regime. His only
weapons, unlike those of the other parties, were symbolic ones-
the support of public opinion and the stated support of the inter-
national community. Initially, there was no question for him of
accepting a formula that would legitimate the actions of his
opponents. For three years, Aristide resisted pressure to grant
amnesty for the coup leaders because he knew that without the
institution of some form of punishment he would be compromis-
ing the dignity of the people who had been tortured or killed.4 9
Aristide also insisted that his return be swift and pushed for inter-
vention by the UN or the United States to restore him to office,
by force if necessary.5 ° U.S. negotiators were reputed to have
been highly frustrated with Aristide's unwillingness to negotiate
on these items."' What they did not acknowledge was that in
order to come as far as he had, Aristide had survived repeated
attempts on his life and on the life of his party. He had made
these advances through determination and not through compro-
mise. He was also in the awkward position of having to accept
help from the very country that he suspected of aiding his oppo-
nents. In the end, Aristide's desire to return and the probability
that that would not happen without major concessions resulted
in his agreement at Governors Island to grant amnesty to the
coup leaders and to wait for four months after the signing of the
accord for his reinstatement. This last concession was fiercely
resisted by Aristide, for he believed that four months gave the
military too much time to organize yet another resistance, as it
indeed did.5 2
46. See id.
47. See SHACOCHIS, supra note 26, at 29.
48. See Nairn, supra note 45. See also McDougall, supra note 41, at 400-01,
403 n.2; SHACOCHIS, supra note 26, at 33-36.
49. See AMERICAS WATCH, supra note 40, at 127.
50. See id.
51. See MALoNE, supra note 35, at 86-87.
52. SeeJEAN-BERTRAND ARISTIDE, DIGNrY 128-29 (Carrol F. Coates trans.,
Univ. Press of Va. 1996).
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In contrast, the coup leaders had every reason to believe that
their goals were attainable and that they could disregard the Gov-
ernors Island Agreement. At the time of the Governors Island
meeting, they had weathered two years of sanctions with their
power intact. They most likely interpreted U.S. reluctance to use
military force, Clinton's inconsistent policy on Haiti, and behind-
the-scenes support from the CIA and Defense Department as a
go-ahead to remain in power. As a senior Canadian party to the
mediation process wrote, the CIA's support of the F.R.A.P.H., its
"black propaganda" designed to undermine Aristide's credibility
and even his sanity, and the U.S. ambassador's apparent sabotage
of an OAS mission to Haiti, surely stiffened the coup leaders'
resistance to compromise.53 Not until U.S. warplanes literally
approached the island on September 18, 1994 did the junta take
seriously a threat of force and decide to accept the deal prof-
fered by the negotiating team headed by former President
Carter.54
How might peacekeeping in Haiti have gone differently
after the coup? Given that the international response from the
UN Security Council and the OAS was not sufficient either to
restore Haiti's first freely elected president or to stop the mili-
tary's terrorism, more principled and decisive actions should
have been considered. Neither the Carter mission nor the U.S.-
led intervention was a proper response. Carter's mission coaxed
a last-minute agreement from the generals, but it was obtained
under duress and rewarded their intransigence. It was not medi-
ation but simply (though admirably, given the alternative of inva-
sion) coercive diplomacy to extricate the generals and restore
order. The United States seems not to have had a mediation
strategy. And a compelling reason why it did not is that while the
State Department supported Aristide's return and consistently
documented the junta's human rights abuses, the CIA and the
Defense Department evidently encouraged the Haitian military
to stay the course.
When finally undertaken, moreover, the U.S.-led multina-
tional force gave very little attention to rebuilding a viable com-
munity in Haiti (see below). Neither the UN Resolution nor the
unsuccessful Governors Island Agreement made any attempt to
outline a plan for meaningful economic and social change.55 A
53. See McDougall, supra note 41, at 400.
54. Robert A. Pastor, More and Less Than It Seemed: The Carter-Nunn-Powell
Mediation in Haiti, 1994, in HERDING CATS, supra note 13, at 507, 524.
55. Resolution 940 did refer to "the significant further deterioration of
the humanitarian situation in Haiti, in particular the continuing escalation by
the illegal de facto regime of systematic violations of civil liberties..." And it
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humanitarian approach might have included strong, regular,
and public condemnations of the junta by international leaders;
U.S. policies that were consistent with proclaimed human rights
objectives, including humane treatment of refugees and termina-
tion of CIA and Defense Department ties to the F.R.A.P.H.; a
much stronger international human rights monitoring effort;
and a clearly targeted development-aid program to support Aris-
tide's reforms, subject to respect for the rule of law. Had these
elements been in place, and had the use of force been credible,
there would have been no need to give the military and paramili-
tary leaders the means of a graceful retirement in exile.
D. Aristide's Return and the Failure of Peacebuilding, 1994-2000
The UN peacekeeping operation in Haiti in 1994 seemingly
established the precedent that an unconstitutional seizure of
power would not be tolerated by the international community,
and therefore that those who had seized power would have to
yield it to legitimate authority. Considering how frequently mili-
tary leaders, among others, had seized control of their govern-
ments during the Cold War era, with the toleration and even
active support of outside powers, the UN's action was indeed
extraordinary. And justified-the Haitian military had ousted a
freely and overwhelmingly elected president, the Haitian people
had been in essence held hostage to the brutal politics of their
leaders for many decades, and the military had failed to abide by
an agreement (the Governors Agreement)-it promised to
uphold that the OAS put before it in 1992.
But the intervention raised troubling issues. The UN action
was largely orchestrated and shaped by the United States, and
thus responded to U.S. interests. Establishing democratic rule
for the first time in Haiti was not one of them. As the United
States so clearly demonstrated in 1970 by its complicity in the
overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile, it is quite prepared to
assist foreign militaries to overthrow freely elected governments
that threaten hegemonic interests. Nor have free elections or
civilian rule been abiding U.S. interests in Latin America, or else-
where, in recent years.56 The main U.S. concern in Haiti was to
"reiterat[es] its commitment for the international community to assist and sup-
port the economic, social and institutional development of Haiti." But the Res-
olution's stated objectives were to restore democratic government and
professionalize the military. S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413th mtg.
at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (1994) reprinted in U.N. Resolution for Invasion of
Haiti, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1994, at A6.
56. U.S. policy in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Brazil at various times
come immediately to mind. In the post-Cold War period, the U.S. response to
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achieve a form of political stability favorable to itself-first, to
keep people from fleeing to the United States, as Clinton fol-
lowed President Bush's policy of forcible repatriation of Haitian
boat people; and second, to ensure the kind of political "stabil-
ity" that is conducive to doing business, both on behalf of U.S.-
based multinational corporations and the U.S. military. 7
In a case where the State is the historical agent of oppres-
sion, a UN or OAS intervention would have had to be directed at
ameliorating the humanitarian crisis that culminated in the mili-
tary's seizure of power. But just as such interventions did not
happen during the Cold War, when far-right and far-left dictator-
ships backed by one or the other major power held sway, so has it
rarely happened since the Cold War's end. The Kurdish prece-
dent was not applied to protect Haitians from their government.
Thus, Kofi Annan's view of limited sovereignty was not extended
to Haiti-type cases.
The U.S.-led force did achieve a de-escalation of violence in
Haiti in that it ended the most brutal and overt forms of repres-
sion. But this was not accomplished by upholding decisions
made by Aristide and Haiti's parliament. Instead, it came about
through the implementation of Washington's agenda for restruc-
turing the Haitian military and economy. First, U.S. forces put
the majority of their efforts into "professionalizing" the existing
army through a retraining program rather than training a new
army. Much attention was given to separating the duties of
police and military in order to limit the power wielded by the
army. Unfortunately, this separation did not include a reduction
Peruvian President Alfredo Fujimori's style of leadership is revealing. In April
1992, when he suspended democratic institutions, and again in his rigged
reelection bid in June 2000, Fujimori rode roughshod over democratic
processes. Though the Clinton administration, along with various Latin Ameri-
can governments, criticized Fujimori's behavior, they quickly abandoned a con-
frontational approach. Larger interests of State, including Fujimori's
commitment to the drug war, and concerns about upsetting "stability" in
Peru-the climate for foreign investment and the strong State, for instance-
evidently argued in favor of soft-pedaling the criticism.
57. The Center for International Policy (C.I.P.) has provided a thorough
compilation of the U.S. military presence in Haiti since 1994 under the rubric
of a "Support Group." Its activities are in "Humanitarian Civic Assistance,"
which is supposed to have ended in early 2000. Around 500 U.S. military per-
sonnel were usually stationed in Haiti up until 2000. Additional U.S. military
aid-several million dollars in sales and grants for construction, training, and
small arms, according to C.I.P.-has been going to a counter-narcotics program
in collaboration with the Haitian police. The program clearly puts Haiti within
the orbit of the U.S. anti-drug effort around Latin America. See Haiti, Center
for International Policy, at http://www.ciponline.org/facts/ha.htm (last visited
Sept. 5, 2000).
2001] 525
526 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 15
in the total number of these forces. Moreover, there was a lack
of attention to justice-soldiers who were documented to have
committed heinous crimes during Aristide's absence were
allowed to remain among the ranks.58
The issue of how to deal with the junta high command was a
prominent and divisive issue between Haitians and their U.S.
occupiers. Many felt that Aristide's restored presidency would be
ineffective at assuaging the hatred and fear of the Haitian people
if it was not accompanied by swift justice for the crimes commit-
ted over the past decade. Those who noticed the need for justice
included American GI's, one of whom remarked, "These people
are really believing in us now. But if these guys just walk free, it's
all going to turn sour."59 The fact that higher ranking officers
were granted amnesty and were funded in comfortable exiles by
U.S. dollars raises the question whether the coup leaders did not
actually emerge as the winners in this battle.
The second focus of the U.S. strategy for de-escalation was
the restructuring of the Haitian economy. The loan agreement
put together by the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.) and
the World Bank provided for the privatization of public services,
a slashing of tariffs, "emergency aid" to the export sector, a
rewriting of corporate laws more favorable to the efficiency of
business, and a limit to the power of the executive branch in
order to discourage corporate regulation. These reforms were
offered in exchange for $770 million in development money,
including $80 million dollars to be used to pay off debt to foreign
banks.6 ° The benefits thus flowed mainly to interests external to
individual Haitians, including the banks and multinational cor-
porations. Ren6 Pr~val, Aristide's hand-picked successor,
angered his mentor by pushing for improved conditions for for-
eign investors, such as privatization of State enterprises and their
availability for foreign ownership.61 Pr6val was simply following
the I.M.F. script for "structural adjustment," which included
58. See Kim Ives, Haiti's Second US Occupation, in HAITI, supra note 29, at
107, 115-17.
59. John Kifner, Haitians Seize Men Accused of Terror Acts, N.Y TIMES, Oct.
18, 1994, at A80.
60. Allan Nairn, Strategy of Social and Economic Reconstruction, in MULTINA-
TIONAL MONITOR, July-Aug. 1994, at 7-9.
61. See Serge F. Kovaleski, Haiti Immersed in Crisis Over Economics, Politics,
N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1997, at A23. Pr~val also pledged that taxes on foreign inves-
tors would be reduced to the same level as local owners, and that the financial
services sector would be available for foreign investment. See Haiti Investment
Climate Statement, U.S. Department of Commerce, National Trade Data Bank, at
http://www.TradePort.com (Sept. 3, 1999).
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throwing open Haiti's doors to imported (American) rice.6 2 As a
result, Haitians' consumption habits shifted away from home-
grown grains, the U.S.-owned Rice Corporation of Haiti took
advantage of low tariffs and cheap Haitian labor to make huge
sums of money in the import and export of rice, and the com-
pany used high-ranking contacts in the Haitian police to smuggle
its products into the country.6 3
The real issue presented by Haiti was not simply the mili-
tary's illegitimacy but its undeniable terrorism. Eliminating State
terrorism was neither U.S. policy nor the UN's mission, however.
Thus, instead of obtaining substantial international resources to
cope with their profound social and economic problems, the
Haitian people got a military intervention. While intervention
was consistent with historical U.S. relations with Haiti, it was irrel-
evant to the structural violence that pervades Haiti's political
economy. The peacekeeping force did establish a kind of order
and did restore Aristide to the presidency; but, nothing changed in
Haiti's political economy. To the present, Haiti remains a
Fourth-World country, with widespread poverty and unemploy-
ment, unstable political processes, dependence on foreign aid,
high indebtedness, and an environment at the mercy of multina-
tional corporations and desperately poor people.
III. A FORCEFUL RESPONSE TO HUMANITARIAN CRISES
Preventive diplomacy is always preferable to the risks and
costs of violent conflict. But it was not used in Haiti, where many
innocent lives were lost while the Security Council and the OAS
tried to sanction the de factos out of power. When the generals
finally left, however, the peacekeepers had little beyond Aris-
tide's return to show for their efforts. Unlike ethnic conflicts,
such as Mozambique and East Timor, where the autonomy of
certain groups and the means of protecting them were accepted,
leading to a negotiated settlement, in Haiti the pattern was closer
to that of two other kinds of intractable conflicts: long-standing
wars and majority-minority conflicts over sovereignty.64 In the
first type, such as Angola, the Kurdish conflicts, Kashmir, and
Rwanda, a huge reservoir of hatred and mistrust has built up. In
the second, such as Russia-Chechnya and China-Tibet, sover-
62. See Michael Dobbs, In Haiti, Push to Free Markets Has Local Costs, WASH.
PosT, Apr. 13, 2000, at Al, A24.
63. See Michael Dobbs, US-Haiti Trade: The Politics of Rice, WASH. POST,
Apr. 13, 2000, at A24.
64. See generally Ted Robert Gurr, Ethnic Warfare on the Wane, FoREIcN
AFF., May-June 2000, at 52.
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eignty is contested within the borders of big powers. The will to
keep fighting in those conflicts far exceeds the will to make (or
keep) settlements, or to allow outside mediation. Haiti resem-
bles both types. Hatred and mistrust of authority, and the
penchant to use violence to resolve political problems, puts Haiti
alongside many long-running conflicts. Haiti also shares one
important attribute of conflicts over sovereignty: it lies in
America's backyard, and the United States, like the Russian and
Chinese governments in their internal conflicts, dominates deci-
sions on its political and economic future.
Unlike most civil conflicts, Haiti's did not end in victory for
the military. Nor did it end in a true settlement. There was no
opportunity to negotiate shared governance and the devolution
of State power. In fact, Haiti showed that elections may not be
the most important aim of international peacekeeping. As a
leading figure in the UN peacekeeping operation in
Mozambique concluded, "no elections would take place without
demobilization" of soldiers 65-and devising appropriate methods
of power-sharing may be premature in some kinds of internal
conflicts.66 Breaking up the terrorist F.R.A.P.H., demobilizing
and completely reorganizing the military, and providing avenues
for citizens to improve the quality of their lives were far more
urgent steps.
Without such preventive, and ultimately peacebuilding,
efforts-structural changes that provide incentives for movement
in the direction of social justice-Haiti remains in political and
economic disarray. Parliamentary elections in May 2000 paved
the way for Aristide's return to power, but a change of political
leaders is a long way from signifying structural change. U.S. and
European donors have prevented the release of aid to Haiti, now
amounting to about $500 million, until they are satisfied with
Haiti's electoral process. Licklider is thus right to conclude that
if we want to see more internal conflicts settled by negotiations
rather than (as is usually the case) by military victory, we need to
65. Aldo Ajello, Mozambique: Implementation of the 1992 Peace Agreement, in
HERDING CATS, supra note 13, at 619, 632.
66. The Carnegie Commission's guidelines for effective power-sharing
are sensible when the parties are politically moderate and committed to moving
toward democratic governance. CARNEGIE COMM'N, supra note 2, at 100. But if
the African experience is any guide, power-sharing can become a dangerous
illusion and should not be attempted in too-comprehensive a fashion. See Ian S.
Spears, Understanding Inclusive Peace Agreements in Africa: the Problems of Sharing
Power, THIRD WORLD Q., Feb. 2000 at 105-18.
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know more about what it takes to make a settlement "stick." In
Haiti, U.S. leaders and mediators didn't bother to find out.67
Conflict resolution sometimes calls for disinterested third-
party mediation and sometimes for a vigorous defense of those
who cannot defend themselves. In many well-documented
cases-Angola-Namibia, El Salvador, Northern Ireland, and
Mozambique, for example-third parties have played crucial
roles in "cultivating ripeness" for settlements. In such cases,
third parties are welcome because of the objective situation on
the ground. Either a relative power balance exists, or neither
side sees a chance of winning, or both sides are simply
exhausted. In any case, both sides finally decide that talking is
preferable to fighting.
But in prolonged humanitarian crises, such as Haiti's, the
objective situation may require a very different form of third-
party intervention. Three circumstances in particular distin-
guished the Haiti case. First, there were no opposing sides, the
people's legitimate representative was in exile, and many still in
Haiti who spoke up for popular interests were murdered. Sec-
ond, political power was in the hands of a criminal clique-coup
leaders who had been widely condemned by the international
community. At that point, reliance on a disinterested, bridge-
building approach to resolving Haiti's crisis was no longer realis-
tic. The junta showed, in its response to OAS sanctions and its
observer mission to Port-au-Prince, that there were "almost no
points on which to base a confidence-building strategy."68 Third,
Haitian sovereignty was not at issue, though the coup leaders
argued as though it was the only issue. Rather, Haiti was the first
test of whether or not the OAS members meant what they said
when they issued the "Santiago Declaration" in 1991 about
defending democracy in the Americas. But the actions that
ensued were tepid. Neither the OAS's refusal to recognize the
military regime and call for trade and other sanctions, nor the
subsequent UN resolution on mandatory sanctions and the Gov-
ernors Island Agreement, convinced the military that it should
step down. Most importantly, none of these actions directly
addressed the human rights crisis in Haiti-the security of peo-
ple, in Kofi Annan's words.69
Perhaps the OAS's and the UN's prolonged reliance on
nothing stronger than sanctions reflected a higher commitment
67. See Roy Licklider, The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars,
1945-1993, AM. POL. Sci. REv., Sept. 1995, at 681.
68. McDougall, supra note 41, at 394.
69. See Annan, supra note 8.
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to respecting even the most illegitimate sovereignty than to sav-
ing lives. Yet, when an oppressive regime is terrorizing its citi-
zens, it should be subject to firm and consistent denunciation.
Crucial to the rejection of an illegitimate government and to the
building of a lasting peace is attention to justice and accountabil-
ity. When the Haitian military and police leaders were granted
not only freedom but access to material wealth and security after
they were exiled, the dignity and worth of their victims was com-
promised, leaving the Haitian majority with the impression that
its struggles continued to be ignored. It is the responsibility of
the intervening parties to insure that illegitimate actors are not
made to appear legitimate-that, as a Norwegian diplomat said
with reference to Colombia's paramilitary groups, " It] he random
killing of fellow citizens in a society should not lead to negotia-
tions in the presidential palace."70 Haiti's crisis was no time for
false neutrality, an abandonment of a commitment to human
rights and the rule of law that is enshrined in numerous UN cov-
enants. It was a time when restoring Haitian sovereignty required
an active commitment to human rights-not merely by bringing
Aristide back (which could be construed as endorsing a particu-
lar political organization), but by working with dedicated Hai-
tians to build (as in Mozambique) a civil society.
Far from imposing the will of outside interests, as critics of
an interventionist approach might contend, we believe that inter-
vention undertaken with thought, transparency, and dedication
to the principle of human worth presents a viable route to lasting
peace. While the degree of political involvement or endorse-
ment may differ between humanitarian relief organizations and
the international community, the ultimate goal of these bodies
should be to manifest this commitment on the level on which
they are acting. This means that we must first and foremost
empower individuals within the community in crisis by helping to
establish and maintain access to the resources that help them
meet their basic needs. The obvious components are decent
levels of nutrition, health care, and education; labor and envi-
ronmental protection; and a political system that at a minimum
ensures freedom from torture and institutions with access and
accountability.
Accountability, however, should not be required only of the
parties in contention. If this strategy of conflict resolution, which
unabashedly endorses a moral imperative for intervention, is to
70. Egeland, supra note 18, at 545. It is one thing, said Egeland, to nego-
tiate with the guerrillas; but the only reason for meeting with "criminal terrorist
organizations" should be "to discuss the laying down of arms." Id.
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limit the opportunity for self-interested actions, it must also
incorporate humane standards. U.S. conduct failed to measure
up to such standards because it did not promote peace with jus-
tice or accountable government. The larger lesson of Haiti may
be that the real stability and security of States depends on global
acceptance of humane standards. Perhaps one must speak first
of adherence to a new global ethic, which most fundamentally
means that all humans can expect to live without fear and in
good emotional and physical health.
Our case study of Haiti also demonstrates the need to link
foreign-policy and conflict-resolution studies when examining
internal conflicts, and the potential shortcomings of legal analy-
sis. Because of their concern with the process and mechanisms
of conflict resolution, conflict resolution and legal studies often
tend to telescope the problem. Their time frame is too short;
crucial background information is ignored or downplayed. In
the Haiti case, a focus only on the rivalry between Aristide and
the generals in the 1990s misses the structural roots of political
violence and economic decay in that country. Such a focus also
tends to distort the U.S. role in Haiti's political and economic
underdevelopment, casting the United States as saviors when in
fact the United States significantly shaped and secured Haiti's
neocolonial economic structure. Finally, a focus on the immedi-
ate political conflict fails to account for the direct links U.S. intel-
ligence and military agencies had, and still have, to the sources of
political repression-links that suggest U.S. interests in Haiti
have nothing to do with helping Haiti's people overcome a leg-
acy of exploitation or its government achieve a meaningful
sovereignty.
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